在他的整个职业生涯中,福多已经订阅了物理主义,声称世界上所有真实的细节和属性要么与某种意义相同,要么取决于物质特征和属性。虽然关于如何制定和理解物理主义存在许多问题 – 例如,“物理”意味着什么以及相关的决定/依赖关系是否是“超级便利”(Kim 1993)或“实现”(Melnyk 2003,Shoemkaer 2007) – 哲学家们普遍接受某种或其他形式的物理主义。接受物理主义就是否认心理和其他非基本属性从基本物理属性中“自由浮动”。因此,接受物理主义与拒绝身心二元论同时发生。福多的一些早期作品(1968,1975)旨在(i)表明“心灵主义”是二元论和行为主义的真正替代品,(ii)表明行为主义有许多严重的缺点,(iii)捍卫功能主义适当的物理主义形而上学,包括心灵主义,以及(iv)捍卫心理学和其他特殊科学的概念,根据这些概念,更高层次的法律及其中所包含的属性对于较低层次的法律和财产是不可减少的。让我们依次考虑这些问题。

美国宾夕法尼亚大学Assignment代写:物理主义,功能主义和特殊科学

Throughout his career Fodor has subscribed to physicalism, the claim that all the genuine particulars and properties in the world are either identical to or in some sense determined by and dependent upon physical particulars and properties. Although there are many questions about how physicalism should be formulated and understood—for instance, what “physical” means and whether the relevant determination/dependency relation is “supervenience” (Kim 1993) or “realization” (Melnyk 2003, Shoemkaer 2007)—there’s widespread acceptance of some or other version of physicalism among philosophers of mind. To accept physicalism is to deny that psychological and other non-basic properties “float free” from the fundamental physical properties. Thus, acceptance of physicalism goes hand in hand with a rejection of mind-body dualism. Some of Fodor’s early work (1968, 1975) aimed (i) to show that “mentalism” was a genuine alternative to dualism and behaviorism, (ii) to show that behaviorism had a number of serious shortcomings, (iii) to defend functionalism as the appropriate physicalist metaphysics underlying mentalism, and (iv) to defend a conception of psychology and other special sciences according to which higher-level laws and the properties that figure in them are irreducible to lower-level laws and properties. Let’s consider each of these in turn.

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